The Adoption of State Economic Development Programs: An Event History Analysis by Cable, Greg & Feiock, Richard C.
Journal of Political Science 
Volume 26 Number 1 Article 4 
November 1998 
The Adoption of State Economic Development Programs: An 
Event History Analysis 
Greg Cable 
Richard C. Feiock 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops 
 Part of the Political Science Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Cable, Greg and Feiock, Richard C. (1998) "The Adoption of State Economic Development Programs: An 
Event History Analysis," Journal of Political Science: Vol. 26 : No. 1 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops/vol26/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Politics at CCU Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Political Science by an authorized editor of CCU Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact commons@coastal.edu. 
The Adoption of State Economic 
Development Programs: an Event 
History Analysis 
Greg Cable 
Jersey City Medical Center 
Richard Feiock 
School of Public Administration and Policy 
Florida State University 
This article elaborates the theoretical relationship between economic need 
and state development policy adoption, and presents empirical analysis of 
the adoption of state revenue bond financing programs between 1969 and 
1979 using event history analysis techniques . Contrary to the conventional 
wisdom that state development policy adoption is driven by political 
competition or an "arms race " among neighboring states, we found that 
partisan control and competition from neighboring states did not affect the 
adoption of revenue bond programs . Relative state personal income is the 
one significant variable in the model. Low income states, where new 
development would generate the most economic benefits, were most likely 
to adopt revenue bond financing. 
Are state adoptions of economic development policies a response to economic or political demands? The answer to this question is critical for efforts to develop and test 
explanations of state policy making and policy adoption. In addition, 
identification of the extent to which development policy adoptions are 
linked to economic conditions can provide a baseline to assess the 
potential efficiency of state development policy. There is growing 
evidence that state and local economic development policies can 
stimulate at least some economic outputs (Plaut and Pluta 1983; 
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Feiock 1991; Bartik 1991). Nevertheless , critics claim that adoptions 
of development programs are not a response to economic need. 
Rather , development policy adoptions are more often viewed as 
symbolic activities or the result of a counterproductive arms-race 
mentality by state political leaders . Dennis Grady 's (1987) empirical 
analysis of state development policies in the mid 1970s provides 
strong support for this argument. 
Identifying the link between economic need and adoption of 
state economic development policies has both theoretical and applied 
importance for understanding the efficiency of development 
policymaking. State economic development policy might be both 
efficient, in the sense of achieving positive-sum economic gains, and 
progressive in that disadvantaged groups disproportionately benefit 
(Feiock, Dubnick and Mitchell 1993; Bartik 1991). A critical, yet 
untested, assumption of this argument is that economic development 
programs are directed to states and localities suffering economic 
distress , in which there is high demand or "willingness to pay" for 
more rapid growth. If incentive offerings are not related to need , the 
result would be an inefficient allocation of new development. 
The relationship between economic need and adoption of 
development policies is critical ; if policy adoption is responsive to 
economic hardship , the result may be both efficient and progressive. 
But, if development policy adoption is responsive to political , rather 
than economic conditions , states not experiencing economic problems 
may attract growth with development incentives, creating allocational 
as well as economic inefficiencies. This article elaborates the 
theoretical relationship between economic need and state development 
policy adoption, and presents empirical analysis of the adoption of 
state revenue bond financing programs between 1969 and 1979 using 
event history analysis techniques. 
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STATE DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
Many have questioned whether state and local policies can 
influence sub-national growth patterns. While no consensus exists, 
most recent work suggests they can. Within the last ten years, there 
has been an accumulation of empirical evidence that state economic 
development policies do influence growth (for a review see Feiock, 
Dubnick and Mitchell 1993). Development policies are intended to 
influence a firm 's cost fimction. While the effect of subsidies is only 
a very small part of a firm's cost calculus, subsidies may have a 
significant marginal effect across similar jurisdictions. 
If state governments have tools to marginally influence 
patterns of economic and population growth, the next question is when 
and if intervening in the market is desirable for them. Neoclassical 
economists argue that government sponsored development incentives 
reduce economic welfare and misallocate investment. Baum (1987) 
demonstrates that, by relaxing the assumptions of the classical model 
to include imperfect competition and limited residential mobility, state 
and local growth promotion can improve the social efficiency of the 
economic development process at both the state and national level. 
Because the social benefits and costs of growth are excluded from 
private investment decisions, state development policy may internalize 
these social externalities thus improving efficiency. Feiock, Dubnick 
and Mitchell (1993) contend that state growth competition is not zero-
sum at the regional, national, or international level. Growth policies 
may generate positive economic gains at both the state and the 
national level by accelerating market adjustment processes. 
In a dynamic model of growth and decline , subsidies 
may be used to speed up market adjustment processes . In 
particular , a declining community may use subsidies to 
attract investment in new export industries at a faster rate 
and with less pain than it would be attracted by ordinary 
market process , declining wages and prices for state 
goods ... generating positive net benefits (Baum 1987 , 
354). 
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Empirical evidence provides some support (Morgan and 
Hackbart 1974; Bartik 1991). Tim Bartik (1991) presents evidence 
that under conditions of high unemployment , the effects of local 
development policy are positive-sum. Moreover , Bartik reports the 
effects of development policies on wages were greater in percentage 
terms for African-Americans and less educated workers . Nevertheless, 
the conditions necessary for positive-sum economic gains or 
progressive benefits have not been clearly specified in previous 
studies. In Bartik ' s analysis progressive effects of growth occurred in 
locations with high levels of unemployment. This suggests that when 
and where there is low demand for growth due to a tight labor market, 
state adoption of economic development policies would decrease both 
economic and allocative efficiency. 
AB consumers of economic development, states seek to 
maximize their economic interests by choosing to adopt or not adopt 
specific economic development policies . While Paul Peterson ( 1981) 
contends sub-national governments have a uniform incentive to pursue 
economic growth despite economic needs and political demand, we 
argue the benefits of growth will vary among states. Not every 
development policy benefits the average taxpayer. This is clearly 
evident from case studies of growth politics (Swanstrom 1985; Stone 
and Saunders 1987). Moreover , empirical analysis at the city level has 
consistently demonstrated that development policy varies substantially 
across cities and that this variation is strongly associated with 
economic distress (Rubin and Rubin 1987; Bowman 1988; Green and 
Fleischmann 1989; Sharp 1991; Clingermayer and Feiock 1991). 
State governments subsidize business firms' investment and 
jobs creation. Unless a state 's marginal benefit from growth equals 
marginal economic and social costs, such competition is inefficient. 
Since taxpayers will be willing to pay more for development in some 
areas than others (Rubin and Rubin, 1987), the economic benefits of 
growth increase with the severity of economic dislocations suffered by 
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states. In states with low incomes, high unemployment, and 
discouraged workers, the demand for growth will be great. 
Political, rather than economic, criteria are often the basis for 
development incentives because development policy is formulated by 
self-interested public officials in a context of resource and information 
constraints. The political incentives of governors and members of 
legislatures to get re-elected can result in development policies that 
depart from the preference of the average taxpayer. Previous work at 
the local level demonstrates that, because economic development 
provides visible benefits for which politicians can claim credit and 
reward constituents or supporters, local officials have incentives to 
pursue growth even when the economic costs exceed their benefits 
(Feiock 1989, 1992). 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The policy adoption examined here is state revenue bond 
financing programs. Revenue bonds have been one of the most 
important development incentives available to state and local 
governments. Borrowing from the work ofLowi (1964), Ambrosius 
classifies revenue bond programs as a distributive policy that provides 
targetable benefits to particular economic interests (Ambrosius 1989). 
Following the work of Berry and Berry (1990), we conceive 
of a program or policy adoption by a state as an event that may or may 
not occur within a particular period of time. For any state we seek to 
determine the probability of adoption during the time period using 
Event History Analysis (EHA) techniques. We use EHA to examine 
the occurrence of the adoption of a revenue bond program at a 
particular point in time. In EHA, the data is a longitudinal record of 
when an event occurred. Until a state adopts a revenue bond program 
it remains "at risk" of the event occurring. The variable to be 
explained is called the "haz.ard rate" and is defined as the probability 
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that a state adopts a revenue bond program in period t, given that it is 
at risk at that time. Because the hazard rate is unobserved, the 
dependent variable in this analysis is a dummy variable coded one for 
the year a state adopts a state revenue bond financing (SRBF) program 
and coded zero otherwise. Table 1 reports the states adopting revenue 
bond financing and the year of adoption. 
Table 1 
States that Adopted State Revenue Bond Financing 
During the 1969-1979 Period 
State Year of Adoption 
Pennsylvania 1970 
Vermont 1970 
Connecticut 1972 
New Jersey 1974 
Michigan 1975 
Illinois 1976 
South Carolina 1976 
Kentucky 1978 
Nevada 1978 
South Dakota 1978 
Louisiana 1979 
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Empirical Models and Hypotheses 
Two indicators of demand for economic development are 
included in this analysis. Toe first is an income based measure of 
economic need. We use the ratio of state per capita income to national 
per capita which reflects a state's "relative income" (RELATIVE 
INCOME; ,} This measures two aspects of how state economic 
position affects the likelihood of adoption. Relative income is an 
objective structural indicator of the well-being of individuals in a state 
compared with a common standard-the well-being of individuals in 
the nation as a whole. We believe that because it is a relative measure 
and permits greater accuracy in comparisons among states, relative 
income has the added dimension of more completely capturing 
policymakers' perceptions of a state's well-being. 1 
The second measure of economic demand is based on state 
unemployment. We created a variable to capture the "recency effect" 
of unemployment rates (Isaac and Carlson 1986). Specifically, we 
used the sum of unemployment at year t and year t-1 (RECENT 
UNEMPLOYMENT;.,) reasoning that recent unemployment figures, 
rather than those from the current or the previous year only, actuate 
economic development policy making because policy makers cannot 
easily claim that a particular year of bad unemployment figures is 
simply an aberration-a "down" year-soon to be followed by an 
upturn in the near future. 
Political demand variables are included in the model as well. 
The first is one-party control of state government. We employ a pair 
of dummy variables to capture the effect of having the governorship, 
and both houses of the legislature controlled by Republicans 
'Grady (! 987) employed the state unemployment rate minus the national rate 
to capture relative unemployment , reasoning that this is the operationalization that directly 
affects policy makers because this is how unemployment is often presented in the popular 
media . 
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(REPUBLICAN CONTROL;.,) or Democrats (DEMOCRAT 
CONIROL ;.,) .2 
The second political demand variable is an indicator of 
regional development competition. To capture the effects of regional 
competition among states, we employ the regional competition 
variables created by Berry and Berry (1990). We test both of their 
operationalizations of regional competition: "the number of states 
sharing a border with state i that had adopted a lottery [in our case, the 
economic development policy] prior to year t" (REGIONAL 
COMPETITION;); and, ''the percentage of states sharing a border that 
had adopted a lottery" (REGIONAL COMPE1TI1ON2;) (Berry and 
Berry 1990, 405). This yields four hypotheses for empirical testing. 
Hypothesis 1: 
Hypothesis 2: 
Hypothesis 3: 
Hypothesis 4: 
Higher income states are less likely to adopt 
state revenue bond financing (SRBF). 
States with greater recent unemployment are 
more likely to adopt state revenue bond 
financing. 
Democrat-controlled state governments are 
more likely to adopt state revenue bond 
financing. 
States with greater regional competition in 
economic development policy adoption are 
more likely to adopt state revenue bond 
financing. 
2The simultaneous inclusion of both of these variables did not result in 
multicollinearity problems. 
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Methods and Data Sources 
Event history analysis was employed to test the models because 
it is appropriate for addressing why economic development policy 
adoptions occur when they do. Excellent surveys of these techniques 
(Allison 1984; Yamaguchi 1991) and their utility in addressing the . 
timing of state policy adoptions (Berry and Berry 1990; Pavalko 1989) 
are detailed elsewhere, but generally, they involve regression analysis 
of "a longitudinal record of when an event happened to a sample of 
individuals or collectivities"-i.e., event histories (Allison 1984, 9). 
Discrete time event history models were estimated because the data 
are measured at distinct and even time periods. The data are pooled 
cross-sections for the period 1969-1979, and the unit of analysis is 
state-years. A state contributes data beginning in 1969 until it adopts 
the policy, at which point the remaining data are (right) censored-the 
state no longer contributes data to estimate a model.3 
We use logistic regression because the dependent variables are 
dichotomous, and derive parameter estimates using maximum 
likelihood estimation. Two statistics are employed to evaluate model 
fit. We employ the Log-likelihood chi-square statistic, which functions 
similarly to the F-test in OLS regression to indicate the statistical 
significance of the independent variables as a group. We also use the 
AIC measure (Akaike 1974, 1987), which adjusts the Log-likelihood 
chi-square measure for the number of observations and independent 
variables employed in the models, to compare the statistical strength 
of competing models of the same data.4 A model which has a smaller 
AIC value than a competitor, ceteris paribus, is a better fit. 
3lt was necessary to have the period of study include 1969 because one-year lags 
are used in some of the independent variables and both policies examined here include 
states that adopted in 1970. 
'The SAS LOGISTIC procedure was employed witch provides the AIC and 
other quantitative measures for assessing model fit. 
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RESULTS 
The results of estimating the state revenue bond financing are 
presented in Table 2. These findings provide support for the economic 
demand explanation , but not the political demand explanation. 
Although the significant Log-likelihood chi-square statistic indicates 
that the model is statistically significant , only one variable-the 
relative income of the state-is statistically significant. States with 
Table 2 
Logit Maximum Likelihood Model Estimates 
of State Revenue Bond Financing (SRBF) 
Independent Variable ML Estimate t-value 
RELATIVE INCOME ;,, -2.67 1 -2.52 
REPUBLICANCONfROL i,I 
.73 .63 
DEMOCRAT CONTR.OU·' .40 .61 
REGIONAL COMPETITIONl ;, .43 .75 
RECENT UNEMPLOYMENT ;,, .11 1.38 
Intercept 5.49 1 4.54 
N-295 
-2(Log-likelihood ratio) 9.601 * 
*p < .05 
Tp < .01 
Ip < .001 
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higher relative per capita personal incomes are less likely to adopt a 
state revenue bond financing measure, after controlling for the effects 
of regional competition, political party control of state government, 
and employment. While in the hypothesized direction, the coefficient 
for unemployment fell short of statistical significance. 
The political demand explanation, however, is not supported. 
Partisan controlled state government did not affect the likelihood of 
adoption of a state revenue bond financing policy. Further , the 
likelihood of adoption is not increased significantly as the number of 
border states (nor the percentage of border states) that have adopted a 
state revenue bond financing policy increases. 
DISCUSSION 
While state economies have experienced renewed growth in 
recent years, development politics and policy remain leading issues for 
state government. Growth policy is particularly critical to sub-national 
politics because economic growth has not translated into the expected 
employment opportunities. While some states recovered faster than 
others from the early 1990's recession, in even these fast-growing 
states, employment growth rates were less than those forecasted from 
increases in productivity. The findings from this article suggest that 
the politics of state development is not dominated by political forces. 
We are somewhat circumspect in our conclusions due to the 
modest findings and the limitations of the empirical analysis. 
Nevertheless, the finding presented here provides interesting insights 
into development policy adoption. First, contrary to the conventional 
wisdom that state development policy adoption is driven by political 
competition or an "arms race" among neighboring states, we found 
that partisan control and competition from neighboring states had no 
effect on this policy adoption. 
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The results also provide some insight into the efficiency of state 
economic development policymaking. Relative state personal income 
is the one significant variable in the model. States with low relative 
personal income , the states in which new development would generate 
the most economic benefits, were most likely to adopt revenue bond 
financing in this period. Nevertheless, the effect of unemployment 
were not significant. The fact that development policy adoption is not 
responsive to unemployment suggests that the distribution of benefits 
is less progressive than has been maintained (Bartick 1991). 
Development policy adoption may be more responsive to the 
economic demands of capital rather than labor. This is consistent with 
studies of the economic outcomes of state and local development that 
have found that the impact of development incentives on capital 
investment is much greater than on job creation. Extending this 
analysis to a broader set of policies and expanding the model 
specification to include a broader set of political and economic 
variables might provide clearer evidence regarding the efficiency of 
state economic development policy adoption . 
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